Sustainability, Design, History

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To cite this article: Mark Jackson (2009) Sustainability, Design, History, Design Philosophy Papers, 7:3, 175-194

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2752/144871309X13968682695271

Published online: 29 Apr 2015.

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Introduction
The metaphysical horizon of sustainability.

Sustain: from O.F. s(o)us tenir; L. Sub + tenere: to hold from below; to support (as with sub-stance and sub-ject).

Can we speak of the discipline of design, and the discipline of design history that would archive its practices, consolidate its origins, regulate its discourses and define its borders? In one respect we can and we do continually activate such a disciplinary field and its historical dimensions, though perhaps as nominalists, as those who recognise that ‘design’ is the name given to a complex of practices that cannot be grounded in a unified structure or meta-theory, that it constitutes a series of more-or-less complementary discourses, at times contradictory, whose practices are heterogeneous to the supposed ideal unity of the defined objects of its discourses. Design histories would perhaps activate the three modes suggested by Nietzsche in his Uses and Abuses of History: those of the monumental, the antiquarian and the critical. With the first we have a history for those aspiring to greatness, for those who will read in what has happened, the monuments, the
greatness of what will be. The second is reserved for those who revere the past, absorbed in the correctness of what has happened in and for itself. As with the first, the past is inflated and the new, what is to come, is despised. Whereas critical history is a creative destruction, a shattering of monuments and antiquities. It activates a past in the present that opens the possibility of a future. It is Nietzsche’s history of the present that Martin Heidegger addresses directly in *Being and Time*, when discussing the ontology of history as a history of the present.1 It is also that which Michel Foucault references in his “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in terms of his own understanding of a history of the present.2 This paper aims to engage a particular nexus of relations between Heidegger and Foucault to approach the question of an ontology of design history. The engagement will be based upon an understanding of historicity as ontological history and historical ontology as the destining of being. This discussion happens in the context of questioning an understanding of sustainability from the vantage point of historical ontology, such that a critical history may enable us to think it otherwise.

We are asked to consider the urgent need to address sustainability in the critical sense of the crises, complex and manifold, of global planning and production. The discourses, histories and theories of design, though increasingly tagging their formations with ‘sustainability’ may require something more than just a turn or fold of these discourses, encountered as the vitality of a timely address. The proposition is that we may need to look to new paradigms for thinking design history in order to arrive at our present differently such that a future yet to be thought emerges, that future not so much tagged or labelled ‘sustainability’ but rather something as yet not thinkable, that may indeed not even be recognisable as what we currently conceive as futural. Sustainability is not the name for solutions but the naming of a crisis. The crisis is and has been sustainability, at least as it has emerged in a modernity whose ground or sub-stance has been the human sub-ject. As will be further discussed, from the perspective of a history of being, modernity unfolds with the *cogito* becoming subjective substance, or ground for the disclosure of beings that are. The subsequent naming of being in modernity (Kantian ‘nature’, Hegelian ‘spirit’, Nietzschean ‘will-to-power’, Heideggerian ‘Enframing’ or ‘orderability’, thence ‘replaceability’ as the already disposable) opens sustainability-design, within this metaphysical history of being, as its most immediate naming. As this paper will come to argue, the ground of sustainability is coincident with that of the subject as substantial disclosure of being, Enframing as the greatest danger and Enowning as the pre-apprehension of its decisive break. Sustainability-design is the crisis of disposed humanity as the already-consumed.

There is a now significant body of critical writing on the discipline of design and design history that questions its orthodox foundations,
its positivist instrumentalism, the assumed humanist agencies of its practices, the unquestioned progressivist or teleological functioning of its programmes and projects. In one sense this paper aligns with a larger body of work that has itself activated coincident critical and philosophical ground. This is particularly the case in questioning something fundamental to how the historical is thought in design, as if what we understand as “the designed” can be segmented or differentiated into its own history. But clearly we here have the inextricable doubling of two critical issues, that of an understanding of design bounded by the most orthodox of historical frameworks, and that of the notion of history whose own activations need to be understood in a radical sense of design. Equally, current discourses of sustainability, though heterogeneous, are predominantly humanist and neo-liberal, and in one form or another positivist and totalising. Though there is an important body of critical writing on sustainability that aligns well with this paper, I want to argue for the urgency in recognising the extent to which sustainability now names design as planetary project and in this sense constitutes the crisis of design itself. In the context of Martin Heidegger’s seminal essay on technology, sustainability is the most recent name for the greatest danger. It is the most recent name for design as such, and I would suggest that we may recognise sustainability-design as the opening horizon of the historicity of the historiographical, of that which decisively opens history.

Games of Truth and Error I: One’s Own History

In the conclusion to his book on Heidegger, Foucault and spatial history, Stuart Elden references a comment made by the postmodern geographer, Edward Soja who was discussing the need for a study on the role of space in key Western thinkers. Soja suggests that such a book would be hindered by “the almost complete absence of a secondary literature that explicitly and perceptively addresses the problematic relation between historicality and spatiality.” While we may debate the merits of such a project, I want to emphasise what Soja refers to as the problematic relation between historicality, or historicity as an ontological approach to history, and spatiality, understood as an ontological approach to space and place. In one sense this paper wants to address the complexity of relations between historiography and design understood ontologically. I want to start by discussing some aspects of Foucault’s own historical or genealogical research.

It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviours or ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies,” but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical
dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter.  

Problematisations and practices, enunciative modalities and practices of subjectification, certainly by the late 1970s constituted for Michel Foucault the ontological dimension to his histories of social and medical practices, techniques of normalisation, disciplinary models, and aesthetics of existence. The “Introduction” to The Uses of Pleasure, constituting as well an introduction to The Care of the Self, enabled Foucault to establish, perhaps retroactively, the kernel of his practices, what he termed “games of truth,” in order to write a history of truth: “Not a history that would be concerned with what might be true in the fields of learning, but an analysis of the ‘games of truth’, the games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience; that is, as something that can and must be thought.”  

Foucault goes on to say something curious and, in a sense, immediately turns around what we might have thought to be the specific objects of his enquiry. He suggests that the studies he is currently undertaking, those of Classical Greek and Roman texts on “an art of existence,” like those studies he has previously undertaken, are studies of “history” but not the work of an “historian”: “The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.”  

Hubert Dreyfus famously reminded us, in a presentation on being and power, that Foucault in his last interview spoke to what I think may be evident in the brief quotes I have already provided from some of his last writings. Foucault suggests: “For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher .... My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger.”  

Dreyfus goes on to quote Foucault a little more from his last interview. Foucault says: “I am simply Nietzschean …” Dreyfus emphasises that Foucault came to Nietzsche via Heidegger. “Games of truth and error” we read as particularly Nietzschean, and we recognise in Foucault’s “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” the fold or shift from archaeology to genealogy, from the problematisations of the sayable and seeable, the discursive and non-discursive, to a micro-politics of power as productive of knowing selves, to practices of subjectivation. And it is not for nothing that after his encounter with Nietzschean genealogy, Foucault works through a radical disclosure with respect to the emergence of modernity, precisely in what he terms the bio-political. Bios here, as Heidegger will emphatically stress, is not in Nietzsche’s thought a biologism as, for example, with a theory of race. The most damaging encounters with Nietzsche in fact took this track. Rather, we could perhaps now most fully understand the articulation of bios, life, in this context, with respect to Heidegger, Foucault and Nietzsche, through Giorgio Agamben’s understanding of ‘bare life’, as an ontological
disclosure of the primordial existence of the existent, of the being of human beings in the epoch of orderability or Enframing.¹¹

Foucault’s engagement with the bio-political as that disclosive horizon for modernity is decisive for our understanding of the emergence of the problematisations and practices that have constituted the complicated and competing fields of sustainability-design. We will be particularly focusing on this aspect of Foucault’s work in part III of this paper. For the moment, I want to draw out something about Foucault’s understanding of “one’s own history,” and then go on to say something more about Heidegger in part II of the paper.

Foucault’s Ontology of the Self

When Foucault suggested that his studies are “studies of ‘history’,” I would want to read this genitive in the sense that in whatever domain Foucault is working, the fundamental problematisation is history as such, its very possibility or horizon from which historicity essentially unfolds, the historicity of the historiographical. One’s own self is not for Foucault the humanist subject of knowledge, the ego-self of a Cartesian cogito. This humanist self as substantial ground for knowing is precisely what Foucault most problematises in his notion of an historical a priori as radically exterior to subjectivity and that which constitutes the subjections of knowing selves. It is for this reason that we would want to read Foucault’s “care of the self” with Heidegger’s engagement in Being and Time with temporality and historicity. As Heidegger notes: “We defined the being of Da-sein as care. Its ontological meaning is temporality.”¹²

For Heidegger, temporality is understood as the primordial condition of the possibility of care and in relation to history: “The analysis of the historicity of Da-sein attempted to show that this being is not ‘temporal’, because it ‘is in history’, but because, on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being.”¹³ As Da-sein is essentially being-in-the-world, the historicity of Da-sein is essentially world historical: “With the existence of historical being-in-the-world, things at hand and objectively present have always already been included in the history of the world.”¹⁴ Without wanting to make a simple word-play on Da-sein and design, in as much as Heidegger suggests in Being and Time that history opens in the historicity of Da-sein, in that Da-sein is ontologically temporal, a history of things at hand, as a design-history, is opened ontologically by Da-sein’s being there. Heidegger will reference Nietzsche’s three historical modes as the three ec-stases of temporality in futurity, pastness and the moment of authentic resoluteness:

Da-sein temporalises itself in the way the future and having been are united in the present … As authentic, the historiography which is both monumental and antiquarian is
necessarily a critique of the ‘present’. Authentic historicality is the foundation for the possibility of uniting these three ways of historiography.\textsuperscript{15}

It is this fundamental relation of self to history that palpably constitutes a shift evident in \textit{The Uses of Pleasure} and \textit{The Care of the Self} that demands an opening to a question of self previously unchartered in Foucault’s work. Under various headings, “the art of existence,” where “art” translates the Latin “\textit{ars}” itself translating (or mistranslating) the Greek “\textit{techne},” or “techniques of the self,” later articulated by Foucault as “technologies of the self,” on the one hand constitutes what Gilles Deleuze emphasised as the third essential ontology for Foucault,\textsuperscript{16} and, on the other hand, marks the imperative of a detour for Foucault beyond the threshold to modernity, as an essential terrain by which to pose a question concerning the desiring self that seems impossible to pose precisely because of the closed horizons of modernity’s subjectifications:

It seemed to me, therefore, that the question that ought to guide my inquiry was the following: how, why, and in what form was sexuality constituted as a moral domain? … But in raising this very general question, and directing it to Greek and Greco-Roman culture, it occurred to me that the problematisation was linked to a group of practices that have been of unquestionable importance in our societies; I am referring to what might be called the “arts of existence.” What I mean by this phrase are those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an \textit{oeuvre} that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{History and Self Formation}

Let’s return to the question of “one’s own history” and the effort to think it. Why would there be such an effort, given that it is what should be most proximate to us, most available for thinking? Foucault, in fact, seems to be suggesting the opposite, perhaps not quite the opposite but certainly some kind of impasse. If one does not make an effort to think one’s own history, then thought in a real sense is un-free, caught presumably in what it is unaware of as its binding, and in this boundedness, thought returns to the same. Thinking one’s own history, perhaps ironically at first glance, seems to be that thinking that opens an horizon of potentiality for difference, for thinking what is unthought.\textsuperscript{18} Foucault expresses it like this: “After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not,
in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afi eld of himself?” We need to say something more here. When Foucault was developing his earlier phase of “archaeology,” he emphasised the difference between two understandings of knowing, which in French are expressed in two different terms, connaissance and savoir, though translated into English by the single term. Recognising Foucault’s debt to Heidegger opens a precise understanding of this difference he is making, and the notion of history he is working with.

Connaissance generally refers to knowing in the sense of that which corresponds between subjects and objects, or, more generally, knowledge as epistemology, particularly that grounded in science. By savoir he means something quite different: the conditions of possibility for the types of objects to be given to connaissance in the first place. That is, how is it that certain things and not others became the objects of truth. By “conditions of possibility,” he employed the term we understand, particularly from Kant as a priori. However, he expresses the concerns of archaeology as those of locating historical a priori, or what constitutes a primordial order such that particular objects become caught in the games of truth. This distinction between epistemology and historical a prioris may be correlated to Heidegger’s understanding of ontological difference, the difference between beings that are in the world and the being of those beings. We have noted the difference Heidegger draws between history, in its average everydayness, as a history of that which is present-at-hand, things in the world and the primordial disclosure or possibility for that history in the historicity of Da-sein. The ontological disclosure of the connaissance of history is a savoir understood as the ec-static temporality of human being, itself engaged by both Heidegger and Foucault via Nietzsche. It was in his inaugural lecture as Chair of the Collège de France, ‘The Order of Discourse’ that Foucault made explicit the relation between savoir, or ontological disclosure and pouvoir, or power understood in a Nietzschean way as will-to-power or will-to-knowledge. Though Foucault does not discuss ontological difference, it becomes embedded in his understanding of what he terms the power-knowledge dispositif, where dispositif may be translated as complex, grid, system, and correlates somewhat with a term developed by Heidegger in “The Question Concerning Technology” to disclose the essence of technology as Ge-stell, often translated as “Enframing.”

We turn to Heidegger to discuss further an understanding of an ontological disclosure of design and history. We should be aware though that after Being and Time, and in Heidegger’s turn to a primordial concern with the disclosure of the meaning of being, rather than the disclosure of Da-sein as openness-to-being, Heidegger’s concern with history and historicity becomes a concern with the history of being, with the essential disclosure of the ways in which
being has been named, and in the de-structuring of this history in order to retrieve the primordial disclosure of being. That is to say, Heidegger’s project of ontology is essentially and inescapably finite and historical, understood as the disclosure of the “sendings” of being and the primordial giving of these sendings.

**Games of Truth and Error II: From Enframing to Enowning**

Heidegger’s life-long concern was with the question of being which he saw by the end of the 1960s as articulated in three phases: initially, and particularly with *Being and Time*, was a concern with the meaning of being disclosive of the essence of Da-sein as openness to being.²² Heidegger had a “precise signification” for ‘meaning’ in the expression ‘meaning of being.’ Meaning is understood from the ‘project region’ unfolded by the understanding of being, where again ‘understanding’ has a precise signification as a “standing before: residing before, holding oneself at an equal height (theoria) with what one finds before oneself.”²³ This formulation was open to considerable misinterpretation, as ‘project’ was too easily understood as “a human performance,” reverting the question of meaning to that of subjectivity. This in fact was Heidegger’s criticism of Sartre’s reading of *Being and Time*. A second and extended phase substitutes “truth” for meaning, asking the truth of being: “In order to counter this mistaken conception and retain the meaning of “project” as it is to be taken (that of the opening disclosure), the thinking after *Being and Time* replaced the expression “meaning of being” with “truth of being.”²⁴ This opens Heidegger’s extensive elaborations on *aletheia*, truth as unconcealedness which is opposed to truth as correctness, an understanding of truth that opened with Platonism and culminated in the Cartesian *cogito me cogitare*, expressed for Kant in terms of an *I think* that accompanies all of my representations, hence a subject constituted as ground for truth of an object. This finite subject-ground becomes absolute with Hegel. *Aletheia*, as primordial unconcealedness of the being of beings itself becomes concealed. Heidegger suggests: “ek-stasis is nothing other than the relation of Da-sein for ἀλήθεια, in which all temporality arises.”²⁵

We have already suggested that Foucault responds initially to this difference in how he uses the terms *connaissance* and *savoir* with respect to archaeology and how he recognises the proximity of *savoir* and *pouvoir*, power, in his genealogical projects that respond more palpably to Nietzsche. The difference is understood in Heidegger’s seminal “Question Concerning Technology” as, on the one hand, *aletheia’s* disclosure of Da-sein’s essential belonging to being as bringing-forth, expressed by Heidegger as *poeisis* in its relation to *techne*. On the other hand, human being as ground, as *subject*, and truth as correctness, discloses the essence, the being of technology as *Ge-stell* Enframing, or ordering and
Da-sein’s essential relation to being as challenging-forth, constituting beings-as-a-whole as ordered resource. Again, we have already noted that the notion of dispositif used by Foucault to engage the complex Enframing of power-knowledge relations may be thought in proximity to Ge-stell. In the Le Thor seminars of the late 1960s Heidegger thinks Enframing and Enowning together in a co-belonging. Technological Enframing is the advent of Enowning: “It means that thinking begins anew, so that in the essence of technology it catches sight of the heralding portent, the covering pre-appearance, the concealing pre-appearing of Enowning itself.”

There is a third phase for Heidegger in pursuing the question of being, no longer as the truth of being (aletheia) but as the topos of being, where topos, location, place is understood radically, exceeding the ontological horizon: “And in order to avoid any falsification of the sense of truth, in order to exclude its being understood as correctness, “truth of being” was explained by “location of being” [Ortschaft] – truth as locality [Ortlichkeit] of being. This already presupposes, however, an understanding of the place-being of place. Hence the expression topology of be-ing [Topologie des Seyns] …” Something needs to be said concerning the notion “Enowning,” which translates the Heideggerian term “Ereignis.” This translation is not without controversy as Ereignis has been translated at times as “event,” “appropriation,” or “event of appropriation.” The term predominates in some of the essays in the collection The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays and is crucial in “The Principle of Identity” and the late Heidegger essay Time and Being. However, with the more recent publication in English of Heidegger’s late 1930s Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), the translators broke with the lexical connectivity of German and English in Ereignis as “event of appropriation,” and opted for a radical translation as “Enowning.” Ereignis at the best of times was difficult to pin down. Heidegger did not want it translated at all: “as little translatable as the guiding-Greek word and the Chinese Tao … and is … a singulare tantum.” The book Contributions to Philosophy is difficult, but germane to our discussion on history, as its rather strange structure, which appears very much like an extensive series of notes by Heidegger to himself, is Heidegger showing the active character of “being-historical thinking.”

The Destining of Being and the Opening of History
The translators of the Le Thor seminars maintained the term “Enowning,” which the seminars elaborate on with respect precisely to being-historical. Enowning has an extraordinary relation to being, and to the sendings of the destinal epochs of being: “There is no destinal epoch of Enowning. Sending is from Enowning.”

Enowning in this sense exceeds the ontological horizon. Heidegger
suggests, in the discussion on this exceeding, that his thinking of the ontological difference was an impasse. It is not that Enowning appears at the end of the history of being, as something beyond it but rather it is only from Enowning that the history of being is able to appear as history of being.\textsuperscript{32} Heidegger proceeds in the 1969 Le Thor seminar to engage in the co-belonging of Enframing and Enowning: “We will now attempt to bring into the open this pre-appearing of Enowning under the veil of Enframing.”\textsuperscript{33} Heidegger discusses one of the sendings of being, destined to “man in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”\textsuperscript{34}

With the further unfolding of modern technology, objectivity transforms into standing reservedness: “Already today [1969] there are no longer objects (no beings, insofar as these would stand against a subject taking them into view) – there are now standing reserves (beings that are held in readiness for being consumed).”\textsuperscript{35} The essence as ontological determination of standing reserve is orderability, rather than persistence or permanence, orderability that posits being as disposable in plan-driven consumption. The essential character of being is replaceability: “The industry of “consumer” products and the predominance of the replacement make this empirically obvious. Today being is being-replaceable.”\textsuperscript{36} Beings as a whole in their being-replaceable are essentially already-consumed thus calling for their replacement. Heidegger gives emphasis to the following: “It is not sufficient, however, to determine these realities ontically. What stands in question is that modern man finds himself henceforth in a fundamentally new relation to being – AND THAT HE KNOWS NOTHING OF IT. … The human is the placeholder of the nothing.”\textsuperscript{37} The human is “used” by being. However, “being needs man as the there of its manifestation.”\textsuperscript{38} Ereignis, Enowning is the opening there of the manifestation of the sendings of being, of historical-being, topology of be-ing.

There is one more thing to discuss with Heidegger before returning to a second engagement with Foucault. In his Parmenides lectures and again in Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger makes a further essential point with respect to historical being, or being-historically. Genuine thinking requires a “leap” to the groundless that is the leap into being. The open as the freeing of every being in its being is a securing in the open of being, the groundless.\textsuperscript{39} This securing is not a refuge for Da-sein precisely in the sense that the open, groundless, as the essential abode of ‘man’ conceals the primordial decision by which being bestows on man unconcealedness, aletheia: “The character of this bestowal hides and secures the way historical man belongs with the bestowal of being … A decision on this entitlement is rarely made.”\textsuperscript{40} History happens, the beginning of history happens in Da-sein’s decisive belonging to aletheia: “It is made every time the essence of truth, the openness of the open, is determined primordially. And that is the beginning of history.”\textsuperscript{41} Precisely because ‘man’ belongs to
the bestowal of being he sees into the open. But equally he can forget being in adhering to the unconcealed. In Contributions to Philosophy, under a heading “Why Must Decisions Be Made?” Heidegger clarifies further what he understands by decision:

The time-space character of decision [is] to be grasped being-historically and not morally-anthropologically, i.e., as the bursting cleavage of be-ing itself. Making room in preparation is, then, indeed not a supplementary reflection but the other way round.
Overall [it is a question of] rethinking being-historically (but not “ontologically”) the whole of human being as soon as it is grounded in Da-sein.42

Games of Truth and Error III: Security and the Biopolitical
Let us return to what I had earlier identified as something essential to Foucauldian research: “The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enables it to think differently.”43
I would now particularly read Foucault’s research, delivered at the Collège de France in the late 1970s, as genealogical engagements with historical-being or being-historically that reveals beings-as-a-whole as standing reserve, orderability, already-consumed and disposed. His genealogy, as a history of the rationality of practices, constitutes in its micropolitics of the exercise of power, the opening to a governmentality of design as that which would give a name to modernity’s epoch of technicity, or the concealing of aletheia in the dominion of the calculable. I suggest we might look to particular Foucault texts for the emergence of a series of problematisations and practices at the end of the eighteenth century that constitute a savoir as the conditions of possibility or historical a priori for the specific objects of design discourses and practices. In his attunement to historical-being, Foucault, even in the wealth of details of practices, does not close off his thinking to the unconcealing of the being of those beings, rather than merely having concern with the unconcealed as such. Design histories, proximally and for the most part, have concerned themselves with the mere unconcealedness of beings in their historiographical ontic encounter, whether those histories are dominated by positivist paradigms of design-science and history as fact, or dominated by interpretative and hermeneutical concerns with the meanings of an artefact world, its ethos and agency, or defined by formalist and aesthetic concerns with categories of design, author-creator agents and the connoisseurship of expert-critics.
But what is the cleave in be-ing that decisively opens history for Foucault, or in what way, for Foucault, does Enowning enown
being? How is the ‘biopolitical’ an opening of history? Foucault’s 1978 lecture series, *Security, Territory, Population*, references biopolitics as the overarching concern of the lecture course:

This year I would like to begin studying something that I have called, somewhat vaguely, bio-power. By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became an object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species.\(^{44}\)

We recognise that Foucault’s project, the language he uses and fundamental concerns seem to bear no relation at all to Heidegger’s, that he is concerned with concrete practices understood as instances of more fundamental structures or mechanisms where Heidegger’s exclusive concern is with the primordial structure of the history of being, that seems to ‘sacrifice ontic engagements in the maintenance of unconcealing the question of being.’\(^{45}\) Yet, I would suggest that Foucault, in his detailed analyses of the emergence of what he terms “apparatuses of security” from the eighteenth century, is engaging with the essential or primordial structures that reveal how the beings that can be experienced and understood. In brief, Foucault outlines three mechanisms or procedures, particularly from the sixteenth century, that may be said to be coincident, though from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, will emerge and recede. These are legal or juridical procedures, disciplinary mechanisms and apparatuses of security.

**Sovereignty, Discipline, Security**

For Foucault, power is constitutive of relations of force and disclosive of forms of knowing. In terms of Dreyfus’s engagement with Foucault and Heidegger on power and being, we may begin to understand Foucault’s power-knowledge *dispositif* in terms of Heidegger’s ontological difference. Power is not a substance and hence is not something possessed or held by a subject. Rather, power is a relation understood (*savoir*) ontologically, diffuse and productive of ontical subjects who themselves, and from the point-of-view of the ontical, seem to have or not have power in the sense of being those beings whose truth (*connaissance*) corresponds correctly or incorrectly with things. The epochal shifts in the ‘sendings’ of being are understood in Foucault’s terms as transformations in relations of force or the constituents of will-to-power as will-to-truth. The shifts from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries may be understood as epochal shifts in being, in how on such and such an horizon, at this time or that,
the order of things is fundamentally disclosed. Thus with the first, juridical and legal mechanisms or procedures, there is a relation of (sovereign) power to a territory, to what is governed or to be governed: “a coupling, comprising the code, between, for example, a type of prohibited action and a type of punishment.”

We might also consider this relation as one between the individuated being of power and the things or individuals subjected to power within the defined territory to be governed, that is to say, primordially grounded in a subject/object relation that we hardly question. We note, however, the significance Heidegger gives to Descartes and Foucault to Galileo in the fundamental epistemic upheaval that inaugurates the modern subject as substantial ground of certainty. We also note the degree to which Foucault spatialises being historically in an ontological disclosure of beings. With disciplinary mechanisms that particularly emerged in the seventeenth century, it is not as if sovereign power disappeared, but rather a “third personage” became involved in the compact between sovereign and individual: “a series of adjacent, detective, medical, and psychological techniques appear which fall within the domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the possible transformation of individuals.” This auxiliary series becomes the predominant technique for maintaining or controlling the flows and movements that complicate a simpler understanding of ‘territory’. Foucault’s example here is often the systematic processes of segmentation and confinement with epidemics, or the maintenance and ordering of a dangerous mass of the unemployed or vagabond classes.

The third of these, apparatuses of security, do not displace juridical procedures, nor disciplinary mechanisms, but engage precisely where these two encounter their limits. Thus, for example, with the question of criminality, what is the probability of re-offending; what is the cost of punishment in relation to the cost of criminal activity; what kinds of people commit this crime and can they be prevented before the crime happens and so on? Security emerges as a technique in the eighteenth century with the development of the science of statistics, as a measure and inventory of the state. The state is no longer territory, but rather that which statistical relations can discern. With statistics, a new entity appears on the horizon of the governance of the state, that of population. It was recognised that at the level of population a state can be planned in ways fundamentally different to having an aggregation of individuated bodies. Foucault emphasises the emergence of economics with Francois Quesnay as a threshold moment, when the question of governance of a state fundamentally shifted from the governance of things, individuals and territory, to the governance of populations via apparatuses of security whose governmentality extended to disciplinary mechanisms and juridical procedures at the level of individuated bodies understood as that by which a multiplicity can be aggregated. More crucially,
the fundamental disclosure of security reveals a new horizon for understanding ‘nature’ that on the one hand opens the space for thinking the human as a natural species at the level of bare life, and on the other, the recognition that economic laws, governed by probability and statistics, introducing norms and normativity, are fundamentally natural laws, but a nature that hitherto totally escaped the sovereign gaze or sovereign control.

This lacuna within which sovereignty loses its powers opens what Foucault names as the crisis of governmentality that has constituted modernity’s fundamental understanding of the state, and the regulatory frameworks by which individuals become productive and things are made. Within the frameworks for his lecture series, Foucault identifies four general features of apparatuses of security: spaces of security; treatments of the uncertain; forms of normalisation, and, predominantly, correlations between security and population: “Population is undoubtedly an idea and a reality that is absolutely modern in relation to the functioning of political power, but also in relation to knowledge and political theory prior to the eighteenth century.” Spaces of security refer to probabilities of temporal events, to what is uncertain within a given space. This may be contrasted with discipline’s hierarchy and distribution of elements and sovereign power’s centralising of an ideal order. Clearly, in the planning and executing of things and functions, one has traces of all three, though what has predominated from the nineteenth century is the abstract nature of the economic and probabilistic understanding of things in their normativity and techniques of normalisation. It is precisely this predominance in the nineteenth century that opened the space for design as that which names the circumstances of these apparatuses and well as the techniques by which disciplinary mechanisms and juridical procedures of normalisation may operate. In as much as apparatuses of security focus precisely on what is uncertain within a given space and the probabilities of particular temporal events, we recognise the extent to which Foucault, in keeping with Heidegger, recognises the space-time of event, a spacing and temporalising to be engaged with ontologically, for Heidegger as Ereignis, Enowning, and for Foucault as evenmentielle, roughly and awkwardly translated as ‘eventalisation.’

Foucault encounters this trajectory in an understanding of the biopolitical in terms of the predominant emergence of security as the crisis of the political, or governmentality. Heidegger reads this trajectory in terms of the oblivion of being in the planetary ordering of beings as the producing of the already consumed disposal of beings. I am suggesting that what brings these two into the most striking relation is a recognition of the emergence of design as that which, in Foucauldian terms, becomes the strategic and tactical procedures of a micro-politics of production and normativity and ontologically becomes the systemic orderability that Heidegger first
named Enframing and that he subsequently names replaceability and disposability. What we currently name sustainability is that with which security has always already been concerned from the moment of its threshold of appearance, as well as encompassing what would be the current disclosure of the being of beings in the already disposed pre-apprehension of replaceability, as that which constitutes the essence of productionist metaphysics. If Heidegger recognises in Enframing the unconcealing of Enowning, what for Foucault is revealed with what he recognises as the crisis of governmentality, and in what manner might this open history in the ‘cleave’ of be-ing? What is this crisis of governmentality and its bearing on design and design history?

**Crises of Governmentality**

The object of Foucault’s research at this time was to develop what he termed “a history of governmental reason,” in order to develop a genealogy of the modern state: “Society, economy, population, security and freedom are the elements of the new governmentality whose forms we can still recognise in its contemporary modifications.” Each of these elements emerges during the eighteenth century and together they constitute, at the level of the understanding of the state, something fundamentally irreconcilable. This “something irreconcilable” becomes the precise understanding of what is to be governed. It opens the space for the biopolitical, for what Agamben has analysed as bare life. On the one hand, there is maintained from seventeenth century Mercantilism an understanding of sovereign power as a relation between the body of the sovereign and that which is to be governed. The fundamental ground of the social contract was constituted on this basis as a sovereign compact between individuals, as if the essential nature of government was based on individuated right and reciprocal obligation. On the other hand, Foucault stresses that the elements of population, security and economics constitutes a fundamentally new ‘nature’ that escapes the mechanisms of governance perfected in the seventeenth century, and that will come to constitute the grounds for liberalism. There is a more essential nature than that of individuals in their freedom and reason. This more essential nature is human being as a species and object of regulatory mechanisms at the level of population. With respect to government, the question that emerges from the eighteenth century and is still with us, is the question of how much government. At what point does the state become an obstacle to the governmentality of populations? Is there too much or too little government? At what point will the state transform into a transparent civil society no longer requiring governance? How is population, with its own laws of transformation, constitutive of a permanent revolution of the state? How are we to reconcile an understanding of individuated rights of humanisms with the rights
of the governed? Or, how does the state justify its imposed limits to liberalism, where *laissez-faire* constitutes a fundamental horizon for apparatuses of security?

Can we give a precise name to this space of the political developed by Foucault as that which circumscribes the crisis of governmentality, as making certain what appears uncertain within a specific temporal horizon? At the level of an instrumentalism of ends and means that coincides with the calculative rationality of a Cartesian “I think,” coupled with the archival imperative of the statistical as the factual ground of the positivities of probability, we may recognise the framing of “design” as a complex of practices whose emergence coincides with this crisis and whose genealogy is inescapable from it. And if the crisis of governmentality operates in a space bounded by two sets of intersecting relations: firstly, those of agents: inalienable right as sovereign power, opposed to the rights of the governed, understood as economic interests and, secondly, those of practices: liberal practices constitutive of an horizon of freedom opposed to coercions constituted in state intervention, then we can perhaps suggest that design’s imperative becomes the sustainability of this bounded space in its irresolution. Sustainability, understood genealogically, is the name we can give to a political crisis of design, understood as the impossible project of the completion of the state in and as its radical elimination. What Foucault’s analyses show is that in considering the governmentality of design we are required to suspend our habitual understandings of sovereign right, human agency and rationalities of truth. And in the radicality of this questioning we are able to recognise that the question of sustainability is not something recently thought as a forward movement in the context of planetary crises, but rather the question of sustainability, in the notion of security, constituted the open horizon for the first effective practices of the global as such. In this, and from the perspective of the governmentality of design, sustainability names that crisis, while sustainability-design constitutes its fundamental procedures.

**Notes**


5. I would also suggest, though not develop in this paper, that the ontology of design cannot be extricated from the issues of spatial ontology as developed by Heidegger and approached historically by Foucault in his histories of spaces of confinement and governmentality.


7. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

8. Ibid., p. 9.


11. See Giorgio Agamben Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen) Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. We should note that Foucault has been criticised for not taking up the political project implied in his understanding of biopolitics. Agamben’s Homo Sacer is explicitly a continuation of that project truncated by Foucault’s death. Though we need to emphasise the extent to which Foucault’s and Agamben’s projects and approaches to the biopolitical differ. Homo Sacer is clearly preoccupied with the biopolitical in terms of continuing Foucault’s engagements with disciplinary mechanisms, spaces of confinement, and the subjection to power-knowledge dispositifs with respect to sovereign power. However, if we look at Foucault’s lecture series from 1978-79, The Birth of the Biopolitical, he is primarily concerned with the emergence in the late eighteenth century of apparatuses of security and liberalism. Most of his lecture course is taken up not with an analytics of the biopolitical in terms of discipline but in terms of the rights of the governed, or the emergence of that relation of power that escaped the sovereign gaze, in short the economic subject. One might say that Agamben misses the critical frameworks that occupied Foucault with the question of the biopolitical, which are closer to his questioning of a genealogy of liberalism that would open a space of thinking the present outside of neo-liberalisms of the right or socialisms of the left.


13. Ibid., p. 345. With respect to ‘care’ it is important to ask if Foucault’s use of the notion coincides with Heidegger’s.
Although ‘care’ is for Heidegger in *Being and Time* the primordial disclosure of being-in-the-world, the notion of ‘care’ needs to be understood much more in terms of taking care of things, being underway with things or doing things. Da-sein is always already caring for things in this sense. Heidegger did not particularly mean ‘care’ in any moral or ethical sense. While Da-sein is primordially being-in-the-world, it is also equi-primordially being with others. Heidegger employs the word ‘concern’ for the primordial disclosure of Da-sein’s being-with. In this sense, there is no direct correspondence with the notion of care used by Foucault. However, it is also worth mentioning that Heidegger does not refer to the care-structure of Da-sein explicitly again after *Being and Time*, and moves away from the disclosure of being in an ontological engagement with human being, in favour of a question of the meaning of being. After *Being and Time*, Da-sein will be displaced by a question of the truth of being. For Foucault, the ‘care’ expressed in the care of the self engages Foucault much more in an ontological questioning of *techne* in its relation to practices of a self. In this Foucault is moving from concerns with historical a priori that construed his understanding of subjection in the formation of selves, to what he termed subjectivisation, as a care of or concern for the self: those threshold moments of a kind of surplus, where concerns with well-being overtake those of survival. See Care of the Self op. cit., p. 216.

18. One thinks here of the short Foucault essay on Maurice Blanchot, *Thought from the Outside*, which is how Deleuze poses the efficacy of Foucault’s third ontology of self, and that radical interiority that thinks the outside of thought or what is yet to be thought. See Michel Foucault and Maurice Blanchot *Foucault/Blanchot* (trans. Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi) New York: Zone Books, 1987.
22. Heidegger *Being and Time* op. cit.
were held at Le Thor in Provence, France on the invitation of Jean Beaufret in 1966, 1968 and 1969. The fourth was held at Zähringen in Freiburg, Germany in 1972.

24. Ibid., p. 41.
25. Ibid., p. 43.
26. Ibid., p. 61.
30. Ibid., p. xix. This quotation originally appears in Heidegger’s lecture ‘The Principle of Identity’ op. cit., where he is discussing the difficulty of the notion of *Ereignis* that plays a crucial role in his understanding of the Parmenidean fragment “Thinking and being belong together in the Same.”
31. Heidegger *Four Seminars* op. cit., p. 61.
32. Ibid., p. xi. A Deleuzian reading of Heidegger might understand this as the univocity of being, as the pure immanence of being. See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (trans. Paul Patton) London and New York: Continuum, pp. 64–66.
33. Heidegger *Four Seminars* op. cit., p. 61.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 62.
37. Ibid., pp. 62–63.
38. Ibid., p. 63.
39. See ‘The Principle of Identity’ op. cit. This text in particular emphasises the ‘leap’ into being.
41. Ibid., p. 151.
42. Heidegger *Contributions to Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 71.
43. Foucault *Uses of Pleasure* op. cit., p. 11.
links between spirit and fire for Heidegger with an essential Hegelianism of the dialectic, again as something which fundamental ontology was to essentially leave.

46. Ibid., p. 5.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 11.