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To cite this article: Susan Stewart & Jacqueline Lorber-Kasunic (2006) Akrasia, Ethics and Design Education, Design Philosophy Papers, 4:4, 231-245

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2752/144871306X13966268131910>



Published online: 29 Apr 2015.



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Akrasia, Ethics and Design Education

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Susan Stewart and Jacqueline Lorber-Kasunic lecture in Design Studies at the Faculty of Design, Architecture and Building of the University of Technology Sydney. Susan has had an interest in the relevance of Aristotelian ethics to contemporary design practice since completing her doctoral research in 1999 on the Aristotelian underpinnings of Sir Henry Wotton's 17th century treatise on architecture. Jacqueline is currently completing her doctoral thesis, which critically combines photography and ethnography in a social documentary project.

Where to start? This paper is about making a start. It is about recognising and responding to openings, rather than focusing on the achievement of ends.¹ In this, it makes a somewhat unconventional approach to discussion of ethics and design, both of which topics are often dominated by consideration of ends, of the problems to be solved.² But it is an approach that should sit comfortably with educators, as education, like this paper, is concerned with making the most of openings.

This paper is also about akrasia; an unfamiliar term that names a failing familiar to us all. Akrasia is the failure to do what one knows to be right (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145a15-b20). It could be said that this is the failing most at issue in contemporary consumer society. We know that we should respect the complexity and fragility of life on our planet, we should reduce energy and material consumption, be open and unafraid in our dealings with otherness, exercise more, eat less, spend more time with friends and family, help those in need and more actively participate in the political life of our community. In many cases we actively desire to do right in such matters. But for the most part we fail.

The dominant sources of *akrasia*, the particular responsibilities that are recognised but nevertheless frequently shirked, will vary from one individual to another; from one culture or sub-culture to the next. But in each case, and this is what is important, *akrasia* alerts us to matters that are of concern for that individual, for that culture (Latour, 2005, pp. 14–41).

The central argument of this paper is built through three successive claims. The first is that *akrasia*, through its momentary recognition (and hasty suppression) of matters of concern, provides an opening, an opportunity for design to respond to something that matters. A design intervention framed in response to *akrasia* may make a difference within the ethical life of the community. The first part of the paper articulates this claim.

The second claim concerns the responsibility that designers bear, both for the prevalence of *akrasia* within the contemporary world, and for taking initiative in addressing that *akrasia*. While the first claim is focused on the ethical life of the design user, this second claim addresses the ethical life of designers and of design culture.

The third claim puts forward an approach to design education that, we argue, will equip graduates for the task of addressing *akrasia*. As design educators, we are concerned to cultivate within our students a disposition to recognise and engage with matters of concern, to help bring about change for the better. However, a disposition to do right, unaccompanied by a knowledge of where or how to begin, is likely to lead only to further *akrasia*, to a failure to act as one believes one should. The third section of the paper, therefore, outlines particular strategies that we believe designers can adopt in responding to *akrasia*, and the educational approach that we have developed to equip our graduates for this task.

The teaching strategies that we will discuss have been developed within the design studies unit at the University of Technology, Sydney, in which we teach and research. This unit, which is directed by Cameron Tonkinwise, was set up three years ago to teach interdisciplinary design to undergraduate students enrolled across four different design discipline areas: industrial design; fashion and textile design; visual communication; and interior design. The design studies curriculum was developed by Tonkinwise in collaboration with colleagues across these four disciplinary areas. The thinking and teaching strategies outlined in this paper have emerged in the context of this collaboration.

Because of the youth of our design studies curriculum, and the emergent character of the understandings that have informed its development, the claims that we make for particular teaching strategies are preliminary only. In the coming years, as the number of graduates from this curriculum grows, further research must be done to gauge the success of this approach. Despite this reservation, however, early indicators suggest that graduates of this

new curriculum will be more attuned to both the possibilities that design offers and the responsibility that design bears in addressing matters that are of concern to user communities.

Akrasia and the Identification of Matters of Concern

This first section is concerned with the ethical life of design users. It opens with an observation about the need for designers to turn their attention to an increasingly dominant mode of user experience, that of multi-tasking.

Since Heidegger's wonderful explication of the ready-to-hand in his *Being and Time*, the figure of a man or woman absorbed in the work of hammering has become almost iconic within thoughtful explications of human-technology engagements (Borgmann, 1984, 1987, 1999; Dreyfus, 1991, 2004; Schön, 1984, 1987). These poetic and insightful reflections on the nature of absorbed, task-oriented engagement have been (and remain) of enormous importance to designers for the light they shed upon user experience and the contexts within which the products of design take their place. They have been especially important to educators for the understanding they have delivered of reflective practices, and the role that tacit and informal knowledges play in shaping everyday know-how (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993; Dorst & Dijkhuis, 1996; Polanyi, 1983). However, in the 80 years or so that have passed since the publication of *Being and Time*, significant shifts have occurred in the work practices dominant within Western culture. While absorbed, task-oriented engagement still has its place, the more fragmented experience of multi-tasking is everywhere on the rise.

The popular recognition within contemporary western culture of multi-tasking as a significant mode of human engagement does not, of course, appropriate multi-tasking exclusively to that culture; the doing of several things at once is, and has been, practiced within many different cultural settings. Further, within each of these settings multi-tasking may have quite different ontological significance; the contemporary urban experience described in this paper does not belong to all multi-tasking. Nevertheless, reflection upon contemporary, consumer culture, within which multi-tasking is significantly enabled by design, allows a previously under-recognised form of breakdown in purposeful human activity to come to view.

For the man or woman engaged in hammering, the world is configured through his or her absorbed material engagement and that-for-the-sake-of-which they are engaged. Those who are absorbed in such focused, task-oriented activity have temporarily backgrounded all concerns and responsibilities other than those belonging to the particular project they have in hand (Dreyfus, 1991).

This account of the backgrounding of non task-related concerns affords us recognition that for us responsibilities are embedded

within worlds that are opened up by the particular projects in which we are, or might be, engaged, such as the project of parenting, of production, or of participation in a political community. These project-oriented worlds, within which we recognise and accept particular constellations of responsibility, loom large or recede from our consciousness as we take up, or turn from, the projects that invoke those worlds.

For a teenager preparing for a social night out, self might be foregrounded, all other realms of responsibility temporarily banished from consciousness. For those engaged in parenting, responsibility for the happiness and well-being of children looms large. For a soldier, responsibilities to his or her nation and colleagues may outweigh considerations of personal well-being.

While one is absorbed in a particular activity, the responsibilities immediately associated with that activity are fore-grounded, and so are attended to as a matter of course. All other realms of responsibility, however, tend to disappear, at least temporarily, from consciousness. Because no consciousness obtrudes, of responsibilities other than those that one is attending to as a matter of course, those who are absorbed in the pursuit of a particular project are unlikely to experience *akrasia*.

For the multi-tasker, by contrast, the diverse projects concurrently managed, with their competing and sometimes irreconcilable demands, configure the world not as a unity but as fragmented, overlaid, stretched and compromised. Such compromised worlds, for all their difficulties, have the virtue of openness. Realms of responsibility less immediate to the multi-tasker's current engagements, such as attention to the needs of the community or the environment, may therefore be admitted, at least fleetingly, to the array that competes for his or her attention.

As the multi-tasker prepares dinner and simultaneously supervises homework, responsibilities to the environment might obtrude, accompanied by a twinge of conscience about the example being set to his or her child as a greasy jar is tossed into the bin. How is the child to become a responsible citizen if their parent fails to recycle? This question is admitted by the *akratic* and guilt-ridden multi-tasker.

As this same inadequate individual emails a colleague in the gap between washing machine cycles, the thought may well arise that a second email – to a lonely friend who has moved overseas – might also be sent (but then a careful reply to a student takes precedence and the opportunity is lost).

Thus the multi-tasker, having opened themselves to the possibility of juggling multiple responsibilities, is more likely to have canvassed (at least fleetingly) the possibility of responding to more of those less immediately pressing concerns that are often of such vital import to the long-term welfare of the community.

This leads us to an important observation: the account of breakdown that was given in Heidegger's *Being and Time* needs to be extended if it is to illuminate the condition of our multi-tasker.

The experience of breakdown within the world of one who hammers is brought about by a failure of equipment, and leads to reflection upon the nature of that equipment and of the task in hand (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 102–103). The possibilities for breakdown within the world of the multi-tasker, however, are not limited to equipment failure but also, and significantly, include moral failure; the multi-tasker, stretched to the limits of their capacity to cope, is vulnerable to akrasia. Akrasia signals a breakdown, but unlike the breakdown of equipment, akrasia rarely leads to reflection. Rather, the cause of akrasia is suppressed, anxiously banished, its fleeting passage marked by the scorings of guilt.

If Heidegger's account of breakdown points to the opening up of a space for reflection within the task-oriented absorption that dominates everyday activity, then how can such an opening be effected through the breakdown that is signaled by akrasia? We shall return to this question in the third part of this paper, where we discuss particular interventions that designers may make. For now we shall simply reiterate the claim that is central to this first section: that akrasia, through its momentary recognition (and hasty suppression) of matters of concern, provides an opening, an opportunity for design to respond to something that matters.

The Responsibility that Designers Bear

Before leaping to an account of the ways in which design might respond to akrasia, we must answer those critics who may (with apparent justice) question the arrogance that assumes such a role for design. Is akrasia really the business of designers?

In this second part, we argue that it is; that not only have designers been complicit in the emergence of akrasia in its current and pressing form, but that a sneaking suspicion of this burden of responsibility is, indeed, an important source of akrasia among thoughtful designers today. Insofar as the latter is true, any reflection on the means by which we can respond positively to akrasia is likely to deliver goods internal to the practice of design, and not just of benefit to the external community (Macintyre, 1981, 1985, p. 188). This second section, then, shifts the focus from the user to the designer.

One of the central purposes that have informed design activity, from the beginnings of modernity to the present, is that of disburdening those who engage with its products (Borgmann, 1984; 1999). The recipients of design are to be benefited by the relief that designed things offer from labour, from need, from the burdens of care. This 'disburdening' role of design is both a great gift to humanity, and a source of the greatest danger (Fry, 1999).

The idea that the products of design disburden users, that design lightens our load in some way, is relatively familiar. But the particular way in which we understand this disburdening role, in our teaching at the University of Technology, Sydney, is informed by the work of two thinkers who have been central to our approach to design, but who are surprisingly underrepresented within design discourse in general.

The first is Elaine Scarry, with her book *The Body in Pain* (1985). The importance of this work has been discussed by Clive Dilnot, and Scarry has been regularly cited by Cameron Tonkinwise in his writing on design, but she seems rarely, elsewhere, to have been given her due (Dilnot, 1995; 2005; Tonkinwise, 2004a, 2004b).

Scarry sees designerly making as a gift from the maker to the user, a gift of relief from the pain that they may feel, from the burdens they bear. Designed products are such a gift, she argues, when the designer has empathically registered the pain, or burden of another, and through this empathic response, through a poetic transference of the pain to his or her own body, has recognised what is needed to relieve that pain (Scarry, 1985, p. 285, pp. 289–300, pp. 306–310).

The products designed in response to this empathic recognition of another's need, according to Scarry, carry within them the understanding with which they have been designed. Thus, a pill bottle with a safety lid and clear labelling knows of the pain that parents would feel if their child were to mistakenly swallow the contents. The handbag with numerous compartments knows of the difficulty and frustration we experience when we are unable to easily locate the item we need (Scarry, 1985: 305).

Scarry sees the world as populated by caring things that help to relieve us of our burdens. She poetically invokes a kind of animism, in which things are our trusted companions, participating in our projects and sharing our responsibilities.

The second thinker that we draw upon in order to understand the disburdening role of design, is Bruno Latour. Latour has been a leading thinker in the development of actor-network theory (ANT), a theory that emerged out of science studies, soon moved to inform technology studies, and is an important source of design understanding. Latour has influenced design thinkers such as Mika Pantzar (1997, pp. 61–65), Carleton Christensen (2005), Jaap Jelsma (2000; 2003; 2004) and (again) Cameron Tonkinwise (2004a).

Latour, like Scarry, sees things as ethical participants within human projects, an idea that he beautifully develops in his essay 'Where are the missing masses?' (1992, pp. 225–258).

Within ANT, people, things, institutions, beliefs, and cultural predispositions, are assembled together as actors within a particular action, regardless of their status as sentient beings (Latour, 2005, p. 63–86). Mike Michael's essays in *Reconnecting*

Culture, Technology and Nature provide an excellent example of the kind of insight an ANT approach can give into the role of designed things within human practices. For example, one of these essays assembles walking boots, a walker, a particular landscape and a cultural predisposition to appreciate the sublime, and shows that this assemblage, brought together, realises a particular form of ethical experience (Michael, 2000, pp. 45–70).

These are the authors from whom we draw our conception of design as disburdening, of designed things as actors within a network of ethical relations. Humans are dependent on these thingly networks; we trust in them, rely upon them, and we are captive to them. There is the rub.

Design has achieved efficiencies within particular realms of responsibility, such as the cleaning and maintenance of dwellings, the reproduction of texts, the transportation of people and things, and the provision of meals (to name only a few). Through such efficiencies, design has allowed for the possibility of multiple realms of responsibility being simultaneously managed.

Multi-tasking is not only a significant context within which contemporary akrasia makes itself felt, it is also a subtle form of re-burdening. As each of us has accepted the possibility of managing more, we have enjoyed the benefits of greater independence from others; but this has simultaneously made us more dependent upon designed things. A parent can now manage responsibilities both to his or her children and to an employer, but only by accepting dependence on transport and communication technologies. The division of labour within families, which sustained unequal dependencies, has been made redundant by design (though it lingers by habit). But the enjoyment of such benefits comes at a price. Could we relinquish such desirable self-sufficiency if we found that our dependence on designed things has locked us into unsustainable practices? Could we relinquish our multiple dependencies on things, upon air-conditioned work environments, comfortable workstations, easy-care garments and fashionable corporate identities (all of which help us with the project of productivity in our work) if such a sacrifice was required of us?

The responsibility that designers have for the nature of *things* is a significant one. If designed things have, through their disburdening care for people, created dependencies between people and their things, and if these dependencies prevent us from doing as we know we should – then designers must accept their complicity in the current prevalence of akrasia.

If designers bear even a partial responsibility for the prevalence of akrasia, we need to consider carefully its positive and negative impacts. The experience of akrasia is stressful, and it is not desirable that stress levels be wantonly increased; but on the other hand, and this is what we want to emphasise in this paper, akrasia also signals the presence of a question.

When someone suffers from akrasia, the question that is raised is not so much: 'What particular flaw in their character caused them to fail to do what they knew they ought to do?' but rather: 'What was it that they felt they ought to have done? What particular realm of responsibilities was making sufficient claim upon them that their failure to respond registered as akrasia?'

Akrasia, failing though it may be, plays an important role in contemporary society, for akrasia indicates the presence of matters of concern (Latour & Weibel, 2005). This uncomfortable movement of the conscience needs to be welcomed, not suppressed, for it presents us with an opening. And this is the crucial point on which this paper hangs.

Educating Designers for Engagement with Matters of Concern

Can design play a role in negotiating the competing claims upon the akratic individual? Can design enable him or her in some way to realise his or her potential as an ethical member of the community? And can design do this in a way that is not self-defeating? That does not simply increase the multi-tasker's entanglement in unsustainable technologies and practices?

These are important questions for design, and for design education.

In our teaching we have developed strategies for the cultivation of two different modes of thoughtful design intervention that may, when used with care, and in combination, open the way for a design response to akrasia. The first of these modes is design for disburdenment, and the second is the making of space for user engagement. Neither of these modes is sufficient alone, and it may be that they are insufficient together; but they are a beginning.

Designing for disburdenment is problematic, as already noted, but it is, nevertheless, a necessary part of any response that designers might make to the promptings of akrasia. What is needed, then, is an approach to disburdenment that appreciates not only the immediate need of a user, but also the way in which the meeting of that need may shift the networks of dependencies within which the user is embedded. Such understanding does not come all at once. Nevertheless, in teaching design for disburdenment, the educator is advantaged by the coherence of this mode of design with traditional orientations and concerns within design education.

Although design for disburdenment is clearly a form of user-centred design, we believe it is important that the design is not limited to addressing needs that the user has *already* recognised and articulated. As akrasia involves the suppression of an impulse, a decision *not* to do what one's conscience suggests one should do, the user may be in denial of the particular matter-of-concern that is making such unwelcome demands upon them. Thus, designing for disburdenment demands skills in interpreting

situations and reformulating briefs, as well as skills in designing things that can both modestly and generously comport themselves to a user's ongoing needs.

Skill in the interpretation of user situations requires the designer to have a sense of the potential difference between the user and him or herself. The first exercise that we ask of first-year design students in design studies engages them in an examination of their own values, through the identification and exploration of the values of a particular sub-culture that they participate in. Each student must evaluate a designed object from the viewpoint of that sub-culture, and make a presentation of this evaluation to fellow students. In the course of these presentations, students encounter the diversity that lies within their own student body and are alerted to the multiple, overlapping or opposing possibilities for interpretation that such diversity presents. This introduction to recognition of otherness is further cultivated through acting classes that require students to embody another's experience and orientation, and through exercises that introduce them to the playful animism of Scarry and Latour. Electives offered to the students in second year and beyond explore other identities further – one subject focusing on the diversity of Southeast Asian identities, and another on participatory design with local communities.

More formal mechanisms for interpreting and reformulating briefs are taught to first-year students by drawing on the texts of Donald Gause and Gerry Weinberg (1977; 1989). Qualitative research techniques are introduced, such as user trips, interview skills and user observation (Cross & Roy, 1975). These are supplemented in second year and beyond by the exploration of more subtle user analysis techniques, such as the design and interpretation of cultural probes (Gaver, Dunne & Pacenti, 1999; Gaver, Boucher, Pennington, Walker, 2004). Students particularly enjoy the development of cultural probes, as this activity explicitly incorporates design into the research activity, overcoming the student tendency to regard research as a preliminary aid to design, separate from design itself. This prejudice, which separates the careful, well researched interpretation of a design situation from the activity of design itself, is an important one to be overcome if graduates are to be capable of designing thoughtfully for disburdenment.

Another area of design thinking that we introduce students to is the design of affordances (Norman, 1988; 1990). By getting them to think explicitly about what practices and experiences they wish their design to afford the user, students are oriented to a consideration of the designed thing as a *collaborator* in the user's projects.

Finally, young designers must be alerted to the user's need to be supported in their care for a particular responsibility, beyond the moment of their engagement with an individual designed thing.

For example, consider that moment of indecision immediately prior to the experience of akrasia, when our multi-tasker fleetingly canvassed the possibility of washing out a greasy jar and recycling, rather than simply tossing it. The impulse to toss may have been fuelled by uncertainty about the relative merit of saving water over recycling glass (this was a particularly Australian moment), and further by a suspicion that the local recycling programmes masked more inefficiencies than they addressed. The decision that was experienced as akrasia may have been brought about by the muddiness that surrounded the consequences of the user's action.

If users are to be enabled to make decisions they can feel good about, the embeddedness of particular actions within larger systems of care needs to be communicated. Design communications expertise can play a role by helping users to visualise both the systems that their actions are embedded within, and the potential consequences of the choice that is made. The expertise of industrial and interior designers can help to script devices and environments in ways that make such choices easier, while fashion designers can shape and equip their garments to allow for the emergence of new behaviours and identities.

Designers need to be aware of the workings of the entire support system that takes care of a particular responsibility. If the akrasia of the user arises in response to the demand that he or she acts responsibly with regard to the disposal of packaging, then not only the packaging itself, but the bins, the collection facilities, the institutions that manage these facilities and the ultimate destination of the disposed item must be taken into account by the designer. Although the designer may contribute to only one link in this chain, knowledge of the entire chain ensures that the new design is appropriate to that chain, and contributes positively to the disburdening role of the whole. One thinker who has done important work in illuminating the issues surrounding such systems is Elizabeth Shove, and we draw quite extensively upon her book *Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: the Social Organisation of Normality* (2003).

The second role that we have suggested for designers in addressing akrasia is that of making space for user engagement.

Here we are pointing to the possibility that an important cause of akrasia is the user's lack of embodied coping practices; practices that would enable the user to take care of that responsibility as a matter of course, as an embedded part of their habitual action (Rouse, 2000, pp. 7–28). Designers can help users to develop such coping practices by making space, within the users' overcrowded lives, for them to engage with the particular responsibility that they have failed to cope with within the normal context of their multi-tasking.

Here what is needed is the creation of circumstances within which the user is allowed to become absorbed, as was Heidegger's

man or woman with a hammer, in task-oriented activity; this time oriented to the discharge of those tasks and responsibilities that he or she has previously failed to cope with. Only within such periods of absorbed attention to a particular task, can reflective practices be cultivated as the foundation for embodied coping.

This, of course, is one role of the holiday.

Holiday destinations that offer a chance to 'get away from it all' and 'experience the simple life' often attract those who desire space in their lives for engagement with natural systems or with the significant others in their lives. Such holidays provide opportunities for absorbed engagement in tasks that respond to the needs of the environment, or of family and friends. Other holidays provide for attention to the welfare of our neglected bodies, providing opportunities for the cultivation of physical fitness and for eating well.

In each case, the time spent in absorbed attention to these normally backgrounded projects, can begin to embed coping practices that may be carried back into our work-a-day lives. But the problem with holidays is that they are seen as 'time out', as partitioned off from our everyday coping, and so the coping practices learned on holidays are often abandoned upon our return.

Aside from the design of holiday facilities and equipment (which is, perhaps, a rather trite response), there are other ways that designers can afford space for engagement to the akratic individual. And these other ways, because they intervene in the normal context of everyday coping, perhaps offer a better chance of making a real contribution.

A particularly interesting example is afforded in the work of Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby of the Royal College of Art in London. Their involvement of design students in the development of technology probes shows ways that designers can create equipment that will help users to engage with a particular issue of concern to them. In published examples of Dunne and Raby's work, the student designs were for equipment that would make the presence of electromagnetic radiation visible within user environments, allowing users (perhaps rather uncomfortably) to recognise and come to terms with the presence of this invisible, and largely backgrounded, product of contemporary practices (Dunne, 1998; 1999; Dunne & Raby, 2001).

Although our students have not yet undertaken the design of technology probes, they have been introduced to the idea of this way of working. We are currently restructuring our final year in order to encourage students to undertake such projects. The beauty of technology probes is that they respond to the human impulse to play. Through playful engagement, users can develop new relations with the equipment within their world (Pantzar, 2000, pp. 3–18). Such playful engagement may create

an ongoing place for a particular practice (such as recycling) within the user's everyday coping.

A final contribution that design can make to the overcoming of akratic behaviour is the investment of particular actions with delight. For example, a project by one student looked at ways to encourage her fellow Koreans to naturally ventilate their dwellings, rather than rely on air conditioning. This student's project proposed a community arts approach to shifting the prevailing cultural predisposition within Korea, that favours sealed environments. The rustling noise made by the paper windows of traditional Korean houses, still remembered by many older Koreans, was to be used as an emotional trigger in promoting natural ventilation within modern dwellings. The cultural memory of paper rustling was to be re-invoked through the placing of paper wind sculptures (constructed by Korean children through the community arts programme) adjacent to newly opened windows in the homes of contemporary Korean city dwellers.

Designed things and environments can have poetic qualities which can be a source of delight; and such delight can help us to feel the 'proper pleasure' in right action that marks the difference between the akratic and the enkratic (or self-controlled) individual (Henry, 2002). Not only does design disburden and enable, but it can also delight; and through this gift of pleasure arising from right action, desired habits and impulses may be fostered (MacIntyre, 1985).

Conclusion

Akrasia is worth attending to because it alerts us to matters of concern. The advantage of attending to akrasia within the design of an ethical curriculum is that akrasia is user driven and is ongoing. Recognition of a source of akrasia enables the designer to intervene on behalf of the user within a situation where that user is failing to cope, failing to do what they know that they ought to do. Teaching students to attend to akrasia as a basis for making sensitive design interventions, has the potential to equip them for a lifetime of ethical design practice. The issues may change, but the approach will remain appropriate.

Attending to matters of concern that surface within a moment of akrasia may prompt a re-examination of what is at stake within the user's current negotiation of the demands made upon him or her by different realms of responsibility. Is he or she working with the right balance? Should there be a rethinking of priorities?

The revealing of matters of concern, and the reconsideration of what is at stake, means that designers who respond to akrasia are engaging with a question, and that is, after all, what designing should be about.

However, we wish to emphasise, in conclusion, that what is put forward by the designer is not an answer or a solution, but

simply a response. It is the designer's hope that such a response may make a difference, may contribute to the ongoing working out of the ethical life of our community; but there should be no claim that it might finally resolve the complex demands of the differing realms of responsibility that we multi-taskers accept, and that define us.

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Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper, titled 'Akrasia and the ethical design curriculum' has been published in *Enhancing Curricula: contributing to the future, meeting the challenges of the 21st century in the disciplines of art, design and communication*, Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of the Centre for Learning and Teaching in Art and Design (CLTAD) in Lisbon, 6–7 April 2006, edited by Allan Davies, ISBN 0-954139-5-7.
2. A notable exception is Clive Dilnot's recent paper 'Ethics? Design?' (2005, pp. 1–149).